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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
JOHNSON v. STATE OF OREGON 
141 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) requires 
employers to provide reasonable accommodations to its dis-
abled employees to enable them to perform the essential func-
tions of their position} In Johnson v. State of Oregon,2 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined the circumstances in which the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel could bar a claim under the ADA when the litigant has 
sought or received disability benefits.3 Because this was an 
issue of first impression, the court relied upon Federal Guide-
lines and case law from other circuits to conclude that the pur-
suit or receipt of disability benefits does not per se bar an indi-
1. See e.g., Johnson v. State of Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998). The ADA 
provides: 
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a dis-
ability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment. [T]he term "discriminate" includes--(5)(A) not making reasonable ac-
commodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless 
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity. 
42 U.S.C. §12112. 
2. 141 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the United States District Court for 
the District of Oregon was argued and submitted on January 8, 1998 in front of Circuit 
Judge Aldisert, Circuit Judge Pregerson, and Circuit Judge Trott. The decision was 
filed on April 20, 1998. Circuit Judge Trott authored the opinion. 
3. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1363. 
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vidual from making a claim against his or her former employer 
under the ADA 4 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Ms. Leslie Johnson was an office specialist for the State of 
Oregon's Vocational Rehabilitation Division (VRD) from 1991 
until her termination in 1994.5 Johnson suffers from Carpal 
Tunnel Syndrome. 6 Her condition worsened during the time 
she was employed by the VRD.7 Finally, after the last round of 
surgery, her doctor recommended a number of unspecified· ac-
commodations that would facilitate her return to work. 8 The 
VRD, however, terminated Johnson's employment on Septem-
ber 8, 1994, because it determined that her requested accom-
modations were unreasonable.9 In September of 1995, Johnson 
filed an action against the VRD for disability discrimination in 
violation of the ADA 10 
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
concluded that the representations Johnson had made in her 
application for disability benefits, regarding her incapacity to 
work, judicially estopped her from pursuing a claim under the 
ADA as a "qualified person with a disability who could perform 
the principle functions of her job with reasonable accommoda-
tions."ll The district court ruled that Johnson could not estab-
lish that she could perform the essential functions of her posi-
tion after she had made prior representations in order to obtain 
4. See id. 
5. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998). 
6. See id. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome is "a disorder of the hand characterized by pain, 
weakness, and numbness in the thumb and other fingers, caused by an inflamed liga-
ment that presses on a nerve in the wrist." Webster's College Dictionary 208 (1996). 
7. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1364. 
8. See id. Johnson underwent five rounds of surgery between 1986 and 1994 to re-
lieve her sYmptoms. 
9. See id. The specific accommodations Johnson was seeking are not specified in the 
court's opinion. 
10. See id. 
11. [d. 
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benefits based on a total disability.12 Hence, the district court 
dismissed Johnson's claim in summary judgment. 13 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, stating that the defi-
nition of "disabled," for the purposes of obtaining benefits, is 
.not necessarily the same as that for pursuing a claim under the 
ADA 14 Therefore, Johnson could properly pursue both claims 
depending on the definition being used. 15 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit first examined the propriety of a per se 
rule that would bar an individual who applied for or received 
disability benefits from maintaining a claim under the ADA 16 
Finding a per se rule inappropriate, the court analyzed the is-
sue within the particular facts of Johnson's case to hold that a 
material issue of fact remained, making summary judgment 
improper. 17 
12. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1365-66. A court's decision that once an individual 
makes representations of total disability in seeking disability benefits that individual 
cannot later come back and assert that she could work if she were accommodated, 
amounts to a per se rule barring ADA claims once an individual has filed for disability 
benefits. See id. 
13. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1364. Prior to trial, the VRD had filed a motion for 
summary judgment, based on judicial estoppel. That motion failed because it was un-
supported by documentation. The district court, however, allowed VRD to renew the 
motion during trial and granted it. See id. 
[d. 
14. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1367. The Ninth Circuit stated: 
Because of the different definitions of disability under the ADA and under the 
various policies of disability benefits-providers, an individual may be disabled-
and therefore entitled to disability benefits so long as she is not working-and 
still be a qualified individual under the ADA becaUse she can work with rea-
sonable accommodations, if her employer will provide them. Thus, neither ap-
plication for nor receipt of disability benefits automatically bars a claimant 
from establishing that she is a qualified person with a disability under the 
ADA. . 
15. See id. Hence, application of a per se rule is inappropriate. 
16. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1998). In determining if a per se 
rule existed barring ADA claims in this circumstance, the Ninth Circuit applied a de 
novo standard of review. See id. at 1364. . 
17. See id. at 1368. In determining if the district court's application of judicial es-
toppel to the particular facts of the case was proper, the Ninth Circuit applied an abuse 
of discretion standard of review. See id. at 1364. 
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A JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AS A PER SE RULE 
The Ninth Circuit relied on the distinguishable purposes of 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the ADA, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, and 
case law to conclude that a per se rule barring an individual 
from asserting an ADA claim once they have applied for or re-
ceived disability benefits was not consistent with current law. 18 
The purpose of the ADA is to "prevent discrimination and 
[to] further work opportunities for those with disabilities."'9 
The SSA, on the other hand, provides disability benefits for 
those who are so severely impaired that they are unable to do 
their job or any other job considering their age and experi-
ence.20 SSA's determination of eligibility for disability benefits 
is made without consideration of whether the employee could 
perform the duties of the job with reasonable accommoda-
tions.21 In contrast, the key to an ADA claim is the efficacy of 
reasonable accommodations necessary to allow someone to per-
form the essential functions of their job.22 
In addition, the EEOC guidelines provide further support 
for rejecting a per se rule.23 The EEOC guidelines state that an 
18. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1366-67. In conducting its analysis, the Ninth Circuit 
court first compared the purposes of the ADA and SSA. One of the central issues in this 
case was how to reconcile an individual's statements to one administration (i.e, the SSA) 
that they are unable to work due to total disability, while telling the court that they 
were able to work with reasonable accommodations as mandated by the ADA. See w. 
Next, the court analyzed prior cases. See w. And, finally, the court considered the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) guidelines in dealing with this 
type of situation. See w. 
19. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1366. 
20. See w. 
21. See w. The Social Security Act does not take into account an individual's abil-
ity to work with accommodations. Thus, where "a claimant had no accommodation in 
his or her past work, a Social Security Administration determination that the claimant 
cannot do past work says nothing about the claimant's ability to perform his or her 
former job with reasonable accommodation." [d. This has led the SSA to conclude: "The 
ADA and the disability provision of the Social Security Act have different purposes and 
have no direct application to one another." [d. (quoting, Swanks v. Washington Metro. 
Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
22. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1366. 
23. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1367. A recent EEOC Enforcement Guidance ex-
plains: 
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individual's representations of total disability for the purpose of 
obtaining benefits is not necessarily inconsistent with the pur-
suit of an ADA claim.24 This is because of the differences in the 
definitional requirements for obtaining benefits and pursuing a 
claim.25 "Accordingly, [the representations made in obtaining 
disability benefits] should never be an automatic bar to an 
ADA claim. "26 
B. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL BASED ON THE PARTICULAR FACTS 
OF THE CASE 
Although the Ninth Circuit did not adopt a per se rule, the 
court concluded that the representations made on benefits ap-
plications are relevant. Z1 In fact, the representations are 
binding in an ADA proceeding as truthful assertions of the 
claimant's condition.28 Moreover, the court found a litigant's 
prior representations are important because they could defeat 
the litigant's prima facie case29 and could indicate that no ma-
terial issue of fact remains. 30 
Because of the inherent differences in the definitions of the term "qualified 
individual with a disability" under the ADA and the terms used in ... disability 
benefits programs ... an individual can meet both the eligibility requirements 
for receipt of disability benefits and the definition of a "qualified individual with 
a disability" for ADA purposes. Thus, a person's representations that slhe is 
"disabled" or "totally disabled" for purposes of disability benefits are not 
necessarily inconsistent with hislher representations that slhe is a "qualified 
individual with a disability." Accordingly, they should never be an automatic 
bar to an ADA claim. 
Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1367 (Citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Notice No. 915.002, 
February 12, 1997, II.A.). 
24. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1367. 
25. See id. For example, although a person could work if provided with reasonable 
accommodations 88 required by the ADA, that person would be totally disabled without 
such accommodations. See id. 
26. See id. (citing, EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Notice No. 915.002, February 12, 
1997,II.A.) 
27. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1368. 
28. See id. 
29. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1369. The court noted that "[flor example, a plaintifl's 
prior representations may be so strong and definitive that they will defeat the plaintifl's 
prima facie case on traditional summary judgment grounds." Id.; see also, Kennedy I). 
Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1996). 
30. See, Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1369. For example, if the litigant stated on the dis-
ability benefits applications that they were permanently disabled from all work, irrele-
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Applying the facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the plaintift's assertions to the various disability benefit 
providers did not contradict her disability discrimination claim 
under the ADA 31 Therefore, the court found that the district 
court had abused its discretion in granting summary judgment 
because a material question of fact regarding the ADA claim 
remained.32 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson v. State of Oregon is 
in accord with a growing number of United States Circuit 
Courts that are disagreeing with the application of a per se rule 
barring ADA claims by individuals who previously applied for 
or obtained disability benefits.33 Although seemingly illogical, 
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson is just. While one 
should not be able to contradict statements made under pen-
alty of perjury, an assertion of a claim under the ADA is not 
necessarily a contradiction to a claim for disability benefits. 34 
The Ninth Circuit noted that judicial estoppel "is an equita-
ble doctrine, invoked by the court at its own discretion, and 
driven by the specific facts of the case. Accordingly, a per se 
rule barring claimants from pursuing ADA claims after seeking 
vant of accommodations, no material issue would remain-summary judgment would be 
granted. See id. 
31. Seeid. 
32. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1363. 
33. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1998). See also, Talavera v. School 
Bd. Of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that it was improper 
to apply a per se rule of estoppel); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 382 
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that applying a per ,a rule of estoppel is contrary to the truth-
seeking function of the court); Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems, Corp., 120 
F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 39 (1998) (declining to adopt a per 
se rule of estoppel); Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area transit Authority, 116 
F.3d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that application for disability benefits cannot be 
an automatic bar to an ADA claim). 
Only the Third Circuit, in McNemar v. The Disney Store, was in conflict with 
these circuits when it upheld a district court's use of judicial estoppel to preclude a 
litigant's claim under the ADA. Subsequently, in Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 
however, the Third Circuit clarified its ruling in McNemar, stating that the case was 
being misapplied and in fact does not support a per se rule. 
34. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1366. Because the standards for evaluating an applica-
tion for disability benefits and a claim under the ADA are different, a contradiction is 
not inevitable between the two. See id. 
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or obtaining benefits runs counter to the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel itself."35 Forcing an individual to choose between ob-
t~ining disability benefits and pursuing a claim under the ADA 
runs counter to the purpose of the ADA 36 The ADA was cre-
ated to protect disabled persons from discrimination. 37 If, how-
ever, an individual is unable to assert hislher rights under the 
ADA because that individual is forced by financial necessity to 
seek disability benefits, the ADA may as well not exist. 36 
The Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to revisit this issue in 
Lujan v. Pacific Maritime Association.39 The plaintiff, Lujan, 
suffered from a disability, which resulted in the loss of use of 
his right arm and hand and difficulty in moving his neck. 40 
Lujan applied for a longshoreman's job.41 Although some long-
shoreman's jobs involve strenuous physical demands, others 
are less demanding, such as signal work and various clerk posi-
tions.42 Lujan filed an ADA claim seeking accommodations, 
which included being excused from the portion of the employ-
ment examination which tests physical strength and agility. 43 
The district court dismissed Lujan's claim because Lujan had 
received disability benefits. 44 The Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court's determination on the authority of Johnson. 46 
Similar opinions have been expressed by numerous other 
circuits46 and in various administrative proceedings. 47 Moreo-
Id. 
35. Johnson, 141 F.3d 1368. 
36. See id. The court noted that: 
Faced with the financial pressures accompanying the loss of a job and the 
uncertainty and length of litigation, individuals might well elect immediate 
benefits over the pursuit of even the most meritorious ADA claim. Such a 
situation would not only harm the individuals the ADA seeks to protect, it also 
would protect the very activity the ADA seeks to eliminate: discrimination 
against disabled individuals. 
37. See id. at 1366. 
38. See id. at 1368. 
39. 165 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 1999). 
40. Lujan, 165 F.3d at 739. 
41. See id. . 
42. See id. at 739-40. 
43. See id. at 740. 
44. See id. 
45. Lujan, 165 F.3d at 739. 
46. See e.g., supra note 33. See also, Pena v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 154 
F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 1998) (declining to adopt a per se rule specifically because SSA defini-
7
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ver, this issue will ultimately be addressed by the United 
States Supreme Court as certiorari has been granted in Cleve-
land v. Policy Management Systems, Corp. 48 
Beryl Slavov * 
tions of disability differ significantly with definitions under the ADA); Rascon v. U.S. 
West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that application or 
receipt of disability benefits is not a bar to a claim under the ADA). 
47. See e.g., Lamberson v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 1999 WL 41623 (M.S.P.D., 
1999). After conducting a thorough analysis of the rulings on this issue by the various 
circuits, the board in Lamberson determined that a per Be rule biuTing an ADA claim 
when the plaintiff has filed for or obtained disability benefits would be improper. id. 
The court also noted the upcoming review by the Supreme Court of Cleueland v. Policy 
Management Systems, Corp. on this issue. See id. at 'II 29. 
48. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sytems Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 
1997) (cert. granted 119 S.Ct. 39 (1998». 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1999. 
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